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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-2648 
_____________ 
 
LESLIE  L. SANDER,  
                        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LIGHT ACTION,  INC. 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
 (D.C. No. 1-10-cv-0684) 
District Judge:  Hon. Leonard P. Stark 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 25, 2013 
 
Before:   JORDAN, GREENBERG and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 26, 2013) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Leslie Sander appeals the denial of her motion for reconsideration of an order 
granting summary judgment to Defendant Light Action, Inc. (“Light Action”) and 
denying her motions for summary judgment and for leave to amend her complaint.  For 
the following reasons, we will affirm.   
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I. Background
1
 
   From 2000 until she was fired in 2010, Sander was an employee of Light Action, 
a Delaware production company specializing in theatrical lighting, staging, audio-video 
systems, and outdoor roofing systems.  She became the company‟s Warehouse Manager 
in 2007 and received a new compensation plan as part of that change in position.
2
  Under 
that plan, Sander was entitled to a guaranteed base pay of $60,000, and she was expected 
to work 45 hours per week.  She could receive additional compensation for working at 
events, or “gigs,” that occurred off-site, and for working overtime hours.  Those 
additional compensation opportunities were intended to keep her total pay level close to 
$74,118, which is what it had been before she changed positions. 
 In keeping with the plan, Sander was paid $1,153.85 a week for the weeks in 
which she only worked on-site, which corresponds to her $60,000 base pay.
3
  When she 
had off-site events, however, her amount of compensation was determined by prorating 
her hours.  For the hours that she worked “in the shop,” she would be paid a 
corresponding percentage of her standard weekly rate.  For the hours she spent at the 
events, she was compensated at a higher rate, meaning that her total weekly 
compensation, assuming she did not take any leave days, was higher than her standard 
                                              
 
1
 In accordance with our standard of review, we recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to Sander, the nonmoving party.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 255 (1986). 
 
2
  She had previously been a Lighting Production Manager.   
 
3
 $1,153.85 multiplied over 52 weeks totals $60,000. 
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weekly pay.
4
  In total, Sander earned $76,253 in 2007, $71,983 in 2008, and $67,653 in 
2009 under that compensation plan.  
 In May 2010, Sander complained to Light Action‟s management on at least one 
occasion about its leave policy and her level of compensation.  Later that month, she 
informed Light Action that she was seeking legal counsel regarding her compensation 
complaints.  On May 26 or 27, several mishaps in the preparation for a show prompted a 
disagreement between Sander and her supervisors, during which she became belligerent 
and hostile.  After she returned home from work that day, she received a telephone call 
terminating her employment with Light Action.
5
         
 On August 12, 2010, Sander brought the present suit alleging, that she had not 
been paid overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 207, 215(a)(2).  On January 24, 2011, she filed an amended complaint that 
added a state law retaliation claim.  After discovery, both parties moved for summary 
judgment, with Sander seeking partial summary judgment on her FLSA claim to overtime 
wages, and Light Action moving for summary judgment on all counts.  Sander then filed 
a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.  On March 21, 2012, the District 
                                              
 
4
  More specifically, Sander was generally paid $388.50 per show, a figure that 
appears to presume ten-hour “show days”.  When Sander worked a show day longer than 
ten hours, she earned $32.28 per hour on top of the $388.50.  Her overtime rate for in-
shop hours was $30.   
 
5
  Sander states in her amended complaint that she was fired on May 26, 2010, 
whereas Light Action says she was terminated on May 27.  Sander does not mention the 
conflict over the show in her briefing, nor does she present evidence to contradict Light 
Action‟s version of that event or deny that it occurred.  We therefore assume that the 
conflict unfolded as Light Action describes, and that it occurred on the day that Sander 
was fired, whichever day that was.   
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Court denied that motion and Sander‟s motion for partial summary judgment.  The Court 
granted Light Action‟s motion, finding that there was no genuine dispute that Sander was 
exempt from the FLSA overtime requirements because she was a salaried employee, and 
that she had presented no evidence of unlawful retaliation.  Sander moved for 
reconsideration of that order, which was denied on May 18, 2012.  This timely appeal 
followed. 
II. Discussion
6
 
 Sander raises three arguments on appeal.  First, she maintains that there is a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether her exempt status under the FLSA was 
undermined by Light Action‟s practice of prorating her hours, which she argues made her 
                                              
 
6
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the FLSA claims pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C § 1331, and over the state law retaliation claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1367.   
We have jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion for reconsideration under 28 
U.S.C § 1291.  An appeal from a denial of a motion for reconsideration also “brings up 
the underlying judgment for review,” Fed. Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 
348 (3d Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted), and Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a)(4)(A) provides that, if a such a motion was timely filed, “the time to 
appeal begins to run from the district court‟s disposition of the motion,” Long v. Atlantic 
City Police Dept., 670 F.3d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 2012).  Sander filed her motion for 
reconsideration and her notice of appeal in a timely fashion, and thus we have jurisdiction 
to review both the denial of reconsideration and the underlying judgment.  See Lazaridis 
v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that the court had jurisdiction 
to review the underlying order dismissing the complaint because the plaintiff‟s “timely 
Rule 59(e) motion tolled the time to file a notice of appeal”). 
 Although we review the denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion, 
id., the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment is subject to plenary review, 
Rauscher, 807 F.2d at 348.  “Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is 
satisfied „that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.‟”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 
(1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).  We review a district court‟s denial of a motion for 
leave to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion.  Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 2001).   
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an hourly employee entitled to overtime compensation.  Second, she asserts that the 
District Court erred in concluding that she failed to plead or prove her retaliation claim.  
Third, she contends that the Court abused its discretion by refusing to allow her to file a 
second amended complaint.  We address her arguments in turn. 
 A. FLSA Exemptions 
 The FLSA establishes the general rule that “no employer shall employ any of his 
employees … for a workweek of longer than forty hours unless such employee receives 
compensation … at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which 
he is employed.”  29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  Nonetheless, certain employees are exempted 
from that requirement, including individuals who are “employed in a bona fide executive, 
administrative, or professional capacity.”  Id. § 213(a)(1).  An employee falls within that 
exemption if she is “[c]ompensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $455 
per week,” her “primary duty” is “directly related to the management or general business 
operations of the employer,” and that duty “includes the exercise of discretion and 
independent judgment.”  29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a).  The employer bears the burden of 
proving that a purportedly exempt employee satisfies those requirements.  See Corning 
Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974) (“[T]he application of an 
exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a matter of affirmative defense on 
which the employer has the burden of proof.”). 
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 At issue in this appeal is the “salary basis” component of that test.7  Light Action 
maintains that, as the District Court concluded, Sander was paid on a salary basis and 
therefore was an exempt employee not entitled to overtime under the FLSA.  Sander 
disagrees, insisting that, regardless of the terms of her compensation package, she was in 
fact paid as an hourly employee and thus should have been paid at a rate one and one-half 
times her normal salary any time she worked more than 40 hours a week. 
 Federal regulations provide that an individual is paid on a salary basis “if the 
employee regularly receives each pay period … a predetermined amount constituting all 
or part of the employee‟s compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction 
because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed.”8  29 C.F.R. § 
541.602(a).  In other words, the employee “must receive the full salary for any week in 
which the employee performs any work without regard to the number of days or hours 
worked.”  Id.  Under that standard, employees “who can be docked pay for missing a 
fraction of a workday must be considered … hourly.”  Martin v. Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., 
949 F.2d 611, 615 (2d Cir. 1991).  On the other hand, employees who receive a fixed, 
predetermined amount plus an amount that may be subject to deductions are generally not 
considered hourly employees.  Harvey v. Homebound Mortg., Inc., 547 F.3d 158, 165 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (“A two-part salary scheme in which employees receive a predetermined 
                                              
 
7
  Sander concedes that her position at Light Action satisfied the “primary duty” 
requirements.     
 
8
  There are a number of exceptions to that requirement.  Most notably, full-day 
absences for personal reasons, sickness, or disability generally can be deducted from the 
predetermined salary without an employee losing exempt status.  29 C.F.R. § 541.602(b).   
 7 
 
amount, plus … an additional portion subject to deductions for quality errors does not 
violate the salary-basis test unless the system is designed to circumvent the requirements 
of the FLSA.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).    
 Sander argues that she is a non-exempt hourly employee under the FLSA because 
Light Action “docked” her hours when she worked outside the shop.  (Appellant‟s 
Opening Br. at 8.)  Specifically, she complains that, by prorating her hours during weeks 
in which she had shows, Light Action was improperly deducting money from the 
“predetermined amount” that she was supposed to receive each pay period.  See 29 
C.F.R. § 541.602(a).  According to Sander, those “partial-day deductions” added up to a 
total of 241.3 hours, and thus she was effectively docked $6,220.04 from 2007 to 2010.  
(Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 23.)   
 But the conclusion that Sander was an hourly employee simply does not follow 
from the undisputed facts of her compensation scheme.  Sander does not contest that, on 
weeks when she did not have any shows, she was paid her standard weekly rate 
regardless of how many hours she worked.  As is clearly demonstrated by her time cards, 
whether Sander worked 31 hours, 38 hours, or 44 hours a week in the shop, she always 
earned $1,153.85.  Moreover, on weeks in which she worked off-site at events, she 
earned even more, provided she did not take any sick days or vacation days.  The reason 
that her hours were “prorated” during those weeks was not to deduct anything from her 
base rate, but rather to ensure that she was paid a premium for the hours she spent off-
site.  In other words, the additional compensation she earned for working at shows was 
effectively calculated on an hourly basis, and she was paid that premium on top of her 
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standard weekly salary.  The multi-tiered nature of that scheme does not change the fact 
that Sander earned as part of her compensation package “a predetermined amount … 
[that was] not subject to reduction.”  29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a); see also Harvey, 547 F.3d 
at 165 (permitting a similar two-tiered structure).  The District Court was therefore 
correct to conclude that there is no genuine dispute as to whether Sander was a salaried 
employee, and her claim to FLSA overtime compensation fails as a matter of law.
9
    
 B. Retaliation Claim 
 In her amended complaint, Sander also brought a retaliation claim against Light 
Action, alleging that the company “intentionally and maliciously discriminated against 
[her] in retaliation for her complaints in violation of 19 Del. C. § 726.”  (App. at 41.)  
Sander now concedes that she has no viable cause of action under that provision of 
Delaware law, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability.  See Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 19, § 726 (prohibiting an employer from discriminating against an employee 
who “opposed any practice prohibited by this subchapter”); id. § 721 (“This subchapter is 
intended to encourage and enable qualified persons with disabilities to engage in 
                                              
 
9
  To the extent that there is a factual dispute regarding Sander‟s compensation, it 
is over the amount of additional compensation to which she was entitled, not whether her 
base pay was subject to deduction.  Sander argues that the show hours calculated at the 
premium rate should have been added on to her $1,153.85 base salary, meaning that if 
she worked a full week outside the shop, she should have earned more than twice her 
normal salary (her baseline $1,153.85, plus a week‟s worth of hours at the premium rate).  
Light Action agrees that she was entitled to compensation above the $1,153.85 baseline, 
but only in the amount represented by the difference between the premium and the base 
rates.  If this case were a contract dispute, that disagreement about the proper size of the 
premium perhaps would call for an interpretation of the pertinent contract provisions, and 
that could conceivably involve factual issues, but a disagreement about the size of the 
premium has no effect on Sander‟s status as an exempt employee under the FLSA.   
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remunerative employment … .”).  Nonetheless, Sander argues that “the unfortunate 
reference to discrimination in the retaliation paragraph” should not have prevented the 
District Court from treating the allegation as an FLSA retaliation claim, which is what 
she says she meant to bring.  (Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 28.)  What she wanted to do 
and what she actually did are, however, quite different.  Sander pled a disability 
discrimination claim under Delaware law, not an FLSA retaliation claim, and she cites no 
authority by which the District Court could have redrafted her claim to make it something 
it was not.  The Court was therefore correct to grant summary judgment to Light Action 
on that claim, as Sander provided no evidence that she was discriminated against on the 
basis of a disability.
10
       
 C. Denial of Leave to Amend the Complaint 
 Finally, Sander argues that the District Court abused its discretion by not allowing 
her to amend her complaint after both parties had moved for summary judgment, less 
than six weeks before trial.  Specifically, in response to a suggestion by Light Action that 
the partial-day deduction argument was not properly raised in the pleadings, she sought to 
add language to the complaint “in support of her claim for non-exemption from the FLSA 
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  Even if Sander had succeeded in pleading an FLSA retaliation claim, the 
District Court correctly concluded that Light Action would still be entitled to summary 
judgment, as Sander presented no evidence that the reason Light Action provided for her 
termination – her belligerent behavior toward her supervisors – was a mere pretext for 
unlawful retaliation.  Cf. Burton v. Teleflex Inc., __ F.3d __, No. 11-3752, 2013 WL 
616973, at *6 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 2013) (holding that when a defendant has provided a 
legitimate reason for an employment action, the burden shifts “back to the plaintiff to 
provide evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably infer that the employer‟s 
proffered justification is merely a pretext for discrimination,” and “[t]he plaintiff must 
make this showing of pretext to defeat a motion for summary judgment”).   
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because of improper deductions from her base pay.”  (Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 11-12.)  
The District Court refused to permit such a late amendment to the pleadings, concluding 
that, “to the extent the Second Amended Complaint would add something new to the 
instant case,” that addition was “too late – and too prejudicial and burdensome to 
Defendant, as well as disruptive to the Court” – to be permitted.  (App. at 17-18.)   
 We cannot say that that conclusion was an abuse of the District Court‟s discretion.  
Although we have adopted a liberal approach to the amendment of pleadings, we also 
recognize that “when a movant has had previous opportunities to amend a complaint,” or 
when allowing an amendment will place “an unfair burden on the opposing party,” there 
may be sufficient ground to deny leave to amend.  Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001).  Here, Sander had many opportunities to amend 
her complaint throughout the discovery process, and yet waited to do so until two weeks 
before the final pretrial conference, plainly burdening both the Court and the Defendant.  
It was therefore within the District Court‟s discretion to deny leave to amend.   
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s denial of Sander‟s 
motion for reconsideration, as well as its order granting summary judgment to Light 
Action, denying partial summary judgment to Sander, and denying leave to amend the 
complaint.    
